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Secure and Sustainable Benchmarking in Clouds
A Multi-Party Cloud Application with an Untrusted
Service Provider
Cloud computing entails a novel security threat: The cloud service provider is entrusted
with the data of all its customers. Encryption may provide the solution. Using the example
of collaborative benchmarking the authors present and evaluate the exemplary design and
implementation that operates on encrypted data.
DOI 10.1007/s12599-011-0153-9

The Author
Dr. Florian Kerschbaum ()

SAP AG
SAP Research
Vincenz-Prießnitz-Str. 1
76131 Karlsruhe
Germany
ﬂorian.kerschbaum@sap.com
Received: 2010-06-14
Accepted: 2011-02-04
Accepted after three revisions by
Prof. Dr. Müller.
Published online: 2011-04-15
This article is also available in German in print and via http://www.
wirtschaftsinformatik.de:
Kerschbaum F (2011) Sicheres und nachhaltiges Benchmarking in der Cloud.
Eine
Mehrparteien-Cloud-Anwendung ohne vertrauenswürdigen Dienstanbieter. WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK. doi: 10.1007/s11576-0110267-1.
© Gabler Verlag 2011

1 Introduction
Cloud computing entails a novel security threat: The cloud service provider is
entrusted with all of the data of all its
customers and may accidentally or maliciously disclose it to third parties. While
the service provider may take the necessary precautions in order to protect the
confidentiality of the data from outsiders
or other customers, the service provider
usually inadvertently learns the data and
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a new trust relationship between customer and service provider is inherent to
cloud computing.
For some applications this trust may
not be sustainable. Consider, for example, highly confidential data about a
company’s operation. In order for the
customer to engage and sustain cloud
computing for applications operating on
such data confidentiality even against the
service provider is necessary. A longterm and sustainable relationship between cloud service provider and customer should be based on minimal trust
assumptions and this includes the trust
of the customer in the service provider.
Therefore, it would be advantageous for
the sustainability of cloud computing, if
the service provider could ensure the customer of the confidentiality of his data.
Assurance and preventive security
measures are essential for confidentiality.
Contracts and fines or other detective
measures of protection require the ability
to prove a confidentiality breach which
can be difficult.
The technical means to provide assurance of data confidentiality without a
reference monitor or policy enforcement
point is encryption. Standard publickey or symmetric encryption as commonly used to secure data communications is inapplicable to sustainable cloud
computing, since it cannot be modified
once encrypted. Homomorphic encryption (Damgard and Jurik 2001; Gentry
2009; Paillier 1999) allows such modifications of encrypted data. Nevertheless it
is too inefficient for large-scale cloud applications. Secure Multi-Party Computation (Ben-Or et al. 1988; Cramer et al.
2001; Goldreich et al. 1987), an alternative cryptographic technique, is computationally more efficient, but requires significant communication resources.
3|2011

The research questions addressed in
this paper are the design choices for a sustainable cloud information system based
on these techniques. The designer has
several options in the choice of encryption scheme, key distribution and security model as well as the application’s
functions and features. He has to balance
the conflicting objectives of functionality,
security and performance.
We will explore these design options
using the case study of a confidentialitypreserving cloud application we have
built. We have implemented a collaborative business application for benchmarking.
Benchmarking is the comparison of
key performance indicators (KPI) to
their statistics within a peer group. Our
cloud application computes these statistics without disclosing the KPIs of any individual company.
Benchmarking is an important process
for companies to stay competitive in today’s markets. It allows them to evaluate their performance against the statistics of their peers and implement targeted
improvement measures. Benchmarking
services have been proposed and implemented before (Bogetoft and Nielsen
2005; Crotts et al. 2006), but none implements sustainable security against the
service provider. The positive impact of
confidentiality protection on the willingness of companies to share data has been
established in related studies (Eurich et
al. 2010).
We have designed, implemented and
evaluated a prototype for collaborative
benchmarking on encrypted data in the
cloud. To the best of our knowledge this
is the first cloud application that operates
on encrypted data. We will use a combination of homomorphic encryption and
135
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secure multi-party computation in order to achieve the necessary performance
and functionality. Furthermore we explore several design options in greater detail.
 Security
vs. functionality (Sects. 3
and 4): First, we show that it is
not feasible to securely implement
all possible (benchmarking) functions
(Sect. 3). While it is always possible
to encrypt and compute on the encrypted data, the result of the computation may reveal the protected input. We give the necessary conditions
for confidentiality-preserving benchmarking. Second, we show the implications of encrypted cloud computing on a rational player and the necessary selection of statistical functions
(Sect. 4). We furthermore show how to
efficiently prevent a novel attack on encrypted cloud computing.
 Security
vs. performance (Sects. 5
and 6): First, we review the design options for key distribution and management and explain our choice (Sect. 5).
Second, we present a novel technique
for comparison using partially homomorphic encryption (Sect. 6). This
novel technique is less secure than
comparable cryptographic techniques,
but significantly more efficient. It also
simplifies the design of the entire application, since then partially homomorphic encryption suffices.
 Functionality vs. performance (Sect. 7):
We present the software architecture
and its component structure, such
that confidentiality-preserving benchmarking can be performed despite its
performance impact.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we describe
the problem of confidentiality-preserving
cloud computing, our protection goals
and compare the available approaches
of homomorphic encryption and secure
multi-party computation. We also explain collaborative benchmarking in detail. In Sect. 8 we report on the implementation and performance measurements. In Sect. 9 we review related
work. Our conclusions are summarized
in Sect. 10.

2 Problem and Approach
Confidentiality-preserving cloud computing attempts to reduce the trust assumption in the service provider by encrypting the data by the customer before transmission to the cloud. There are
136

two cryptographic techniques to achieve
this: homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation.
2.1 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a modern
encryption technique where one operation on the ciphertexts produces an encryption of the result of a homomorphic
operation on the plaintexts. Its application to confidentiality-preserving cloud
computing is straight-forward. The customer encrypts the data, retains the key
and sends the ciphertext to the service
provider. The service provider performs
operations on the ciphertexts that map
to the homomorphic operations on the
plaintext.
Recently a fully homomorphic encryption scheme where the homomorphic
operation is “logical not-and” (NAND)
has been developed (Gentry 2009). It can
be used to implement any function on the
plaintext. Nevertheless this scheme is still
considered too inefficient to implement
secure functions. Instead we use more efficient encryption schemes where the homomorphic operation is limited to addition of integers (modulo a key-dependent
constant) where not all operations can
be implemented on the plaintext. We will
later confirm that performance remains
a critical aspect. We used Paillier’s encryption scheme (Paillier 1999) and its
threshold variant by Damgard and Jurik
(2001). Let EX (x) denote the encryption
of x with X’s public key and DX () the corresponding decryption with X’s private
key, then the following property holds:
DX (EX (x) · EX (y)) = x + y.
With simple arithmetic the following
property can be derived
DX (EX (x)y ) = x · y.
2.2 Secure Multi-Party Computation
Homomorphic encryption cleanly separates computation from input, but is
limited to certain operations for performance reasons. An alternative technique
is secure multi-party computation. In secure multi-party computation the function is not computed by only one party
on the ciphertexts, but as a joint protocol
by all. At the end of the protocol a defined
subset of the parties will be able to reconstruct the result, but all parties know how
the computation is performed regardless
whether they receive a result or not.

Protocols that can implement any
function have been proposed based on
secret sharing (Ben-Or et al. 1988), oblivious transfer (Goldreich et al. 1987) and
homomorphic encryption (Cramer et al.
2001). Generally speaking, one can implement additional functionality to the
homomorphic operation by using interactive protocols between the players.
Its application to confidentialitypreserving cloud computing is less obvious. The customers and the cloud service
provider engage in a secure computation protocol. The service provider will
be treated just as another party. The
clients provide input and every party—
including the service provider—will
learn nothing except what can be inferred
from their input and output. Care must
be taken in order to balance the computational load in favor of the customers
(Kerschbaum 2009).
For secure multi-party computation a
formal security model has been defined
(Goldreich 2002). Recall that a party may
not learn anything that cannot be inferred by its input and output. A proof
for security may define a simulator which
is given input and output and then show
that the statistical difference between the
simulator and a real protocol run is a
negligible function of a security parameter. The two models defined by Goldreich
(2002) are semi-honest and malicious. In
the semi-honest model the adversary follows the protocol, but keeps a record of
all messages to infer additional information. In the malicious the adversary may
behave arbitrarily.
There exists a compiler from protocols
secure in the semi-honest model to protocol secure in the malicious model (Goldreich 2002), but the resulting protocols
are very inefficient. Furthermore the malicious protocol does not prevent providing false input, such that we have to assume the parties provide the correct input in order to obtain the correct result.
We will revisit this problem in Sect. 4.
2.3 Collaborative Benchmarking
in the Cloud
Benchmarking helps companies to stay
competitive in today’s markets. A KPI is
a statistical quantity measuring the performance of a business process. Examples from different company functions
are make cycle time (manufacturing),
cash flow (financial) and employee fluctuation rate (human resources). A peer
group is a group of (usually competing)
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Fig. 1 Overview of
conﬁdentiality-preserving
cloud computation

companies that are interested in comparing their KPIs. Examples using different
characteristics include car manufacturers
(industry sector), Fortune 500 companies in the United States (revenue and location), or airline vs. railway vs. haulage
(sales market).
Let there be n customers Xi and one
cloud service provider SP. Each customer
Xi has one KPI value xi —we consider
each KPI separately. They want to compute several statistics about x1 , . . . , xn
(we also treat every peer group separately). The following functions are candidates commonly chosen in individual
benchmarking: average, variance, maximum, median and top quartile.
The cloud computing paradigm entails
that each customer Xi only communicates with the service provider SP, i.e. we
prohibit any direct communication between the customers. Assuming a malicious service provider this central communication pattern corresponds to the
attacker controlling the network and we
inherit the security challenges from this
model, such as no key agreement without
a trusted third party.
Business & Information Systems Engineering

Our protection goal is the confidentiality of the customer Xi ’s KPI value xi , i.e.
neither any other customer Xj (j = i) nor
the service provider SP should learn xi .
2.4 Solution Overview
In the next sections we review several design choices. In order to relate them to
the overall design we present Fig. 1 of the
confidentiality-preserving cloud computation. In this life cycle of the computation we first observe a key distribution
(Sect. 5). Then the parties submit their
encrypted input (Sect. 6) before the secure computation takes place where we
discuss the functions to be computed
(Sect. 3). Then the (encrypted) result is
returned where special pre-cautions need
to be in place (Sect. 4).

3 Conﬁdentiality
Secure multi-party computation can ensure the confidentiality of a single KPI,
single peer-group computation, but our
cloud application needs to handle multi3|2011

ple peer groups and multiple KPIs. Computation of multiple KPIs do not interfere
with each other, since they are independent, but multiple peer groups may, since
they may share common parties.
Let λi,j = 1 if Xi participates in the
jth peer group and λi,j = 0. Since the
number of customers in a peer group is
known, the computation of the averages
s1 , . . . , sj can be written as
s = Λx.
In case Λ is invertible or pseudoinvertible any party can compute the input from the output. In this case any secure computation (or homomorphic encryption) is unnecessary. A security proof
for the plaintext protocol would be possible, but irrelevant. There is no security
mechanism that may prevent learning the
input from the output in this case and
therefore there is infeasible to construct
a confidentiality-preserving cloud application for this function. This problem
arises if any subset of peer groups consists
of linearly dependent sub-vectors except
for the element which corresponds to the
party with the revealed KPI value.
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There are two possible countermeasures. First, the cloud service provider
can make only peer group assignments
that do not contain any such case. Second, the customer only participates in
safe peer group assignments. The second
case has the advantage that the customer
can verify the confidentiality of his KPI
and there is no explanation necessary in
case participation is denied by the cloud
service provider. Furthermore, the choice
of participation by a party may make the
assignment unsafe for another party. The
only assignment scheme that prevents all
these problems is to assign each party’s
KPI to at most one peer group, since already in case of two peer groups participation of one party can lead to linearly
dependent sub-vectors.

4 Incentive-Compatible
Mechanism
Any collaborative application implements a mechanism from game theory.
Given a utility function rational players
will behave in a way that leads to an equilibrium. There are several seminal results
that we will revisit for our benchmarking
application.
The
fundamental
problem
of
confidentiality-preserving computation
is that the input data can no longer be audited by an external party. The cloud service provider and other customers have
no assurance that a party submitted correct data. Even in the malicious security
model there is no security mechanism
for enforcing truth telling. A natural solution is to investigate the incentives of
the players and whether it is in their best
interest to provide correct data. Game
theoretic analysis can assist when assuming rational players.
The first observation is that we need to
assume that all players are interested in
obtaining the correct result of the computation. Would just some players be not
interested in obtaining the correct result,
they would not provide the correct input leading to an equilibrium where no
player is inclined to provide correct input.
Problems arise when we assume that
players are also interested in obtaining information about the other players’ input
or withholding the result from them, i.e.
a mixed utility function.
The first seminal result is a specification of non-cooperatively computable functions (Shoham and Ten138

nenholtz 2005). Loosely speaking, a noncooperatively computable functions is
one that is neither dominated by one’s
input (i.e. can be computed from one’s
input) nor invertible. In case of invertible functions players would be inclined
to provide false input, then reverse the
function and recomputed it with correct
input. The conclusion of Shoham and
Tennenholtz (2005) is that sum, average
and maximum are not non-cooperatively
computable, while median and top quartile are.
The second seminal result is that the
equilibrium in secure multi-party computation protocols is to not compute,
since the players are not inclined to exchange the result shares (Halpern and
Teague 2004; Abraham et al. 2006). Every
party that sends its result shares to other
parties has only those parties profiting,
i.e. it does not act in its best interest, since
it only needs the shares from the other
parties to obtain the result. Halpern and
Teague (2004) presented the first protocol for overcoming this problem. Later
the result was improved by Abraham et
al. (2006).
Fortunately this second dilemma does
not arise in cloud computing. In cloud
computing we can assume that the service provider has an interest in providing the correct result to its customers in
order to maintain a sustainable business
(Kerschbaum 2009). The service provider
can then act as an intermediary forwarding the results to all parties, since it profits
from forwarding and not only from the
result.
In confidentiality-preserving cloud
computing on encrypted data another
dilemma arises. Assume the service
provider has computed the result, but
it is still encrypted under the homomorphic encryption scheme where only the
customers hold the key. In a collaborative application there is usually only one
result, but multiple customers that all
want to obtain the same result. Also decryption in the computation phase and
result publishing are usually decoupled.
The following simple attack is rational
for the service provider: He submits to
all parties their input ciphertext, obtains
the plaintext and computes the result on
the plaintext which he publishes. In this
case he has delivered the correct result
(i.e. maximized its utility function) and
obtained all input information.
There are two options for preventing
this attack. First, the service provider may

only ask one customer to decrypt the result, but the customers are not supposed
to communicate among each other. So
the chosen one cannot determine it is
the only one. Second, the service provider
submits the same ciphertext to all customers. This can be verified using signatures from the customers. This prevents any attack violating confidentiality
as long as the correct result is delivered
(Kerschbaum 2008).

5 Key Distribution
and Management
Homomorphic encryption requires a key
to protect the information. In order to
process the ciphertexts each ciphertext
needs to be encrypted under the same
key. This key needs to be protected, since
if it is leaked, confidentiality of the data is
at risk.
The architect has the following design
choices
 single or threshold key,
 static or dynamic key,
 key agreement secure against passive or
active adversaries.
The key agreement should be chosen
secure against the same type of adversary as the secure computation protocol, since the composition will be secure
only against the weakest one. In Sect. 4
we have designed our protocol to be secure against an economically motivated
active adversary and therefore key agreement must be secure against a (stronger)
active adversary.
Key agreement protocols secure against
active adversaries require a trusted third,
e.g. the certificate authority in public key
infrastructures (PKI). Our key agreement
protocol therefore requires one as well
and the service provider cannot be this
trusted party, since this would reduce security to security against passive adversaries (i.e. the trusted third party is assumed to behave as expected).
If a third party needs to be involved
in key agreement, two service providers
would be required. It can therefore be advisable to choose static keys and limit the
third party to a one-time interaction. Dynamic keys require a key agreement protocol for each round of computation and
should only be used in case the key agreement can be performed without the interaction of the trusted third party, e.g.
using PKI. Note that, public keys in PKI,
as any static, break anonymity, since they
can be used a static pseudonym.
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The impact of the choice between single and threshold key is not always clear
cut. On the one hand a single key if
leaked compromises the security of the
entire system, but this is more critical
for static keys which have to be stored
on disk. Nevertheless any collusion between service provider and any other
party breaks the security of the system,
even in case of dynamic keys. On the
other hand a threshold key does not automatically imply security against collusions between service provider and other
parties, because intermediate results are
often necessary to enable the functionality using partially homomorphic encryption. In the case of benchmarking securing the protocol against collusions between service provider and other parties
has proven to make the protocol too inefficient, even when using a threshold key.
In summary, we chose a single, dynamic session key for the homomorphic
encryption which is established using a
key agreement protocol secure against
active adversaries without the active involvement of the PKI certificate authority
as a trusted third party.

6 “Homomorphic” Comparison
When computing statistics, a key problem next to addition is comparison.
Comparison is essential for statistical
quantities, such as the median. In case
of the benchmarking platform the inputs
are encrypted using homomorphic encryption.
Let E(x) denote the encryption of x ∈
Zn in the homomorphic encryption system. The problem is to construct an algorithm or protocol, such that given E(x)
and E(y) the service provider can compute E(c) where c = x < y (represented
by elements from Zn ). Clearly fully homomorphic encryption can perform this
task, but also Fischlin (2001) described
how this can be performed using the homomorphic encryption system by Sander
et al. (1999). In this encryption scheme
each bit of the input is encrypted as its
own ciphertext, such that additions of integers are no longer possible. We therefore propose a solution using additive homomorphic encryption.
Our solution is based on multiplicative blinding. We map the integers from
[−n/2, n/2] to the integers [0, n − 1]
similar to two-complement notation, i.e.
0 → 0, n/2 → n/2, −n/2 → n/2 + 1 and
Business & Information Systems Engineering

−1 → n − 1. We can then encrypt the integers [−n/2, n/2] using homomorphic
encryption (modulo n).
Given E(x) and E(y) the service
provider will choose random numbers
0 < r and 0 ≤ r < r and compute
E(c) = (E(x)E(y)−1 )r E(r )
= E(rx − ry + r ).
It holds that
x < y ⇔ c < 0.
6.1 Information-Theoretic
Conﬁdentiality
Correctness of the homomorphic comparison is easy to verify, but security is
difficult. We hide the difference a = x −
y of the plaintexts using multiplication
with a random number r.
b = ra + r .
Our security model is informationtheoretic and not cryptographic. Consequently we can ask the question what
does b reveal about a. First, note that if
the bit length of r is likely to be known,
then the bit length of b reveals the bit
length of a, since
lgr + lga − 1 ≤ lgb
≤ lgr + lga .
We therefore choose the bit length of the
number r first and then the remaining
bits uniformly.
One can now assess the security of
the homomorphic comparison under a
number of attacks. In the simplest case a
ciphertext-only attack is performed on a
given b. The information theoretic measure for leakage of b about a is the conditional entropy
H(A|B) = −Σp(B = b)Σp(A = a|B = b)
× log p(A = a|B = b).
Unfortunately we cannot assess it analytically, but we can sample it. Kerschbaum (2010) has conducted a large
scale experiment and estimates a leakage
of 0.11 bit for a single sample with 16 bit
a and 512 bit r chosen using normal distribution.

7 System Architecture
7.1 Components and Use Cases
So far we have only considered the cryptographic aspects of the benchmarking
3|2011

protocol, but the entire system consists of
several components and use cases (Kerschbaum 2007). We briefly describe here
the use cases of our benchmarking platform.
 Registration: A party approaches the
service provider to participate in the
benchmarking process. This includes
creation of account, payment, in case
of a static key its distribution and triggers peer group formation. The participants of registration are the party,
the service provider and the certificate
authority. The only pre-condition for
registration is a system setup between
the trusted third party (certificate authority) for key agreement and the service provider. In case of PKI this is the
installation of the root certificate at the
service provider. The post-condition of
registration is that the peer group formation use case can afterwards be performed.
 Peer Group Formation: Registration
triggers peer group formation where
the party is assigned a peer group to
benchmark against. We consider this
a separate use case due to the complexity of the function and different
implementation alternatives involving
different parties. We describe an algorithm to assign each party a peer
group. Recall that for confidentiality
reasons each party can be in at most
one peer group. The peer group formation may affect the peer group assignment for parties other than the
one that just joined, but we can perform formation completely automatic,
such that the only participant of this
use case is the service provider. The
pre-condition is that sufficiently many
parties have registered at the service
provider. The post-condition is that
the remaining two use cases of statistics
computation and statistics retrieval
can be performed.
 Statistics Retrieval: Once a party has
registered and been assigned a peer
group, it can start to benchmark.
Benchmarking involves an analysis of
one’s KPIs in comparison to the peer
group for which the statistics need to
be retrieved from the service provider.
Note that a party can start to benchmark right after peer group formation
and does not have to wait for statistics computation, i.e. it can retrieve the
statistics even if its own KPIs have been
involved in the computation. This increases the benefit for the customer by
eliminating waiting time. The service
139
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provider maintains a database of the
statistics which the party may access.
The pre-condition is that peer group
formation has been completed. There
is no post-condition.
 Statistics Computation: Triggered by
the service provider the benchmarking protocol starts to compute the
statistics. The challenge is, of course,
to perform the computation on encrypted data. The computation is decoupled from the retrieval, i.e. off-line.
The participants of the protocol are
all members of a peer group and the
service provider. Pre-condition is that
peer group formation has been completed and there is no post-condition.
The principle to decouple user interaction (benchmarking) from secure computation is very vital in handling the performance constraints of computation on
encrypted data. It is a deviation from
most cloud computing approaches, but
has been adopted in the other deployed
secure computation as well (Bogetoft et
al. 2009).
7.2 Peer Group Formation
Peer group formation is triggered by the
registration of a new party, but performed non-interactively by the service
provider. The goal of peer group formation is to identify the groups that are
likely to benefit most from benchmarking against each other. The assumption is
that the more similar peer group members are, the better the benchmarking result.
We view the peer group formation
problem as a data classification problem. We try to assign each party a classifier, its peer group. First during registration each party publishes non-sensitive
characteristics about itself to the service
provider. These characteristics should be
rather stable for a company but vary between companies. They should be relevant to the business model of the company and their combination should be almost identifying, i.e. unique.
These characteristics form an mdimensional space in which each party
represents a point. The data classification problem is to divide the space, such
that the data points in the resulting subspaces have low spatial extension. This is
commonly called data clustering.
The fastest partitional data clustering
algorithm is k-means clustering. Given a
parameter k, it identifies k clusters minimizing the average distance to the cluster
140

center. K-means clustering is a randomized algorithm, i.e. it does not necessarily
find the optimum, but its output ranges
over a number of near-optimal solutions
depending on a random input parameter.
K-means clustering, as any standard
clustering algorithm, is not directly applicable to peer group formation. In order to preserve the confidentiality of the
KPI values each peer group must be
of minimum size. This constraint must
be observed in the data clustering algorithm. Bennett et al. propose using linear programming (LP) in order to minimize the distance to the cluster centers
while observing the constraints (Bennett
et al. 2000). Unfortunately for the problem sizes considered in peer group formation LP does not scale and we need a
solution that preserves the superior performance of k-means clustering.
Kerschbaum (2007) introduces k, lmeans clustering which is a greedy variation of k-means clustering where each
cluster has to have at least size l. The basic idea is as follows. In each round of the
algorithm we iterate through the clusters
until each cluster has size l. If a cluster has
less than l members it “grabs” the nearest ones until it has l members. We keep
track if a data point has been reassigned
to a new cluster and each data point may
be reassigned at most once in order to
prevent infinite loops. At the end of this
iteration each cluster has at least l members.
We performed an analysis of the quality of peer group formation. In collaboration with industry experts we defined a
measure for quality of a peer group. The
maximum distance in any characteristic
is used a quality measure: The smaller
this distance, the better the cluster. We
evaluated k, l-means clustering using different distance norms and cluster sizes.
Astonishingly the distance norms made
little difference and we settled for the Euclidean distance, but the clustering performed better if the minimum cluster
size l was increased if there were artificially introduced cluster in the population. This implies that k, l-means clustering performs better than k-means clustering, if the size l of the clusters is known.
As described in Sect. 7.1 peer group
formation is triggered by a new party
joining the service provider. It is therefore
sufficient to assign this new party to an
existing cluster instead of performing a
full data clustering for reassignment. This
also limits the number of peer groups
where statistics need to be recomputed.

Consequently we simply choose the best
peer group for the new party and split
this group into two if exceeds a threshold.
For splitting we can use k, l-means clustering again. The difference between the
quality of incrementally assigning peer
groups and the quality of always performing a full peer group assignment is
negligible.

8 Performance
Performance for computations on encrypted data remains critical and very few
experimental evaluations exist. Our protocol has quadratic O(n2 ) computation
and communication cost. We therefore
implemented the benchmarking protocol
for the statistics computation use case.
Following current practice in industry
we implemented the protocols over web
services as a communication mechanism
(Kerschbaum et al. 2009). Each client
and server runs its own web application
server with a web application for the protocol implementation. The implementation is entirely written in Java with the
crypto modules taking advantage of the
BigInteger arithmetic of Java’s standard
library.
We evaluated our implementation in
an experimental study in the following
setup. The service provider was deployed
on a Pentium 4 3.2 GHz machine with
1.5 GB of memory. All clients were deployed on a Xeon Dual 3.6 GHz machine
with 8 GB of memory. Between the client
and server machine we deployed a WAN
emulator as a router. The WAN emulation software was the dummynet package for FreeBSD (Rizzo 1997). All machines are physically connected via a nondedicated Gigabit Ethernet switch.
In a first experiment we increased the
number of clients from 5 to 45 in steps of
5 and we increased the latency on the network connection from 0 to 100 milliseconds in steps of 25. The latency or delay is
used to simulate WAN conditions as over
the Internet. A delay of 100 ms results in a
round-trip time (RTT) of 200 ms, which
roughly corresponds to the RTT between
Germany and Japan over the Internet.
It became apparent that in this experiment the network performance plays a
significant role. For 45 clients and a delay
of 100 ms the time spent for communication is almost half of the overall running
time.
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For the next experiment we modified
the server implementation. Instead of sequentially calling each client, we create a thread for each client that asynchronously handles the communication.
This is made possible by our benchmarking protocol, since each round for each
client only requires input of the previous round and all clients can run concurrently. The order of the clients does
not matter for the protocol’s semantics.
The necessary synchronization between
rounds is achieved using a barrier.
We conducted the same series of experiments for the concurrent implementation. We increased the number of clients
and independently increased the network
delay. The results are depicted in Fig. 2.
The impact of the network performance
has significantly decreased and is almost
negligible compared to the impact of the
computational effort. For 45 clients and a
delay of 100 ms the time spent for communication is only 6% of the overall running time.
We conclude that computation on encrypted in the cloud can be implemented,
such that its performance is almost independent of the network performance, i.e.
for the overall performance it nearly does
not matter whether the clients are located
on the same LAN or half-way around the
world over the Internet.

9 Related Work
Collaborative benchmarking service platforms have been first proposed and
implemented by Bogetoft and Nielsen
(2005). In addition to parametric (statistical) they implemented non-parametric
benchmarking using data envelope analysis (DEA). DEA is based on linear
programming which is currently out of
reach of practical secure computation, although theoretical protocols exist (Li and
Atallah 2006; Toft 2009).
Secure computation for benchmarking
has been first proposed by Atallah et al.
(2004). They implement a number of secure division protocols for implementing time series. In our case of statistical
benchmarking time series can be computed on the local data and the computed
statistics, both in plain text. Encryption
is unnecessary, since the protection of the
KPIs stems from the aggregation as statistical quantities.
There also exist a number of secure
computation protocols for computing
statistics. Most notably (Aggarwal et al.
Business & Information Systems Engineering

Fig. 2 Performance of benchmarking on encrypted data
2004) describes an efficient protocol for
computing the median. As with any secure computation protocol, the model is
based on distributed, mutually distrustful parties, and it is not clear how to apply it in the cloud service provider case.
When applied straightforwardly it is no
more efficient than our protocol.
There are also a few protocols for securely computing statistics using a central service provider. Di Crescenzo (2000)
describes a protocol for the sum and
Di Crescenzo (2001) describes a protocol for the maximum. Both use a semihonest service provider and thereby avoid
the problem of key agreement, but, of
course, introducing a certificate authority does not make the protocols secure in
a stronger security model.
One challenge is to combine the protocols for the different statistics and remain
efficient. To the best of our knowledge
the homomorphic comparison is the first
and most efficient proposal for a comparison operation on homomorphically encrypted data (Kerschbaum and Terzidis
2006). A related proposal has been made
later by Sakuma and Kobayashi (2007).
Their security “proof ” is questionable,
since it does not compare the probability of the different cases, but only shows
that there is at least one for each combination of numbers. Therefore the leakage
as proposed by us provides a much better
analysis.
Our homomorphic comparison competes with a huge number of secure inequality comparison protocols, to name a
few (Damgard et al. 2008; Fischlin 2001;
Yao 1986). These protocols implement
secure “greater-than” comparison of two
private values, also known as Yao’s mil3|2011

lionaires’ problem after the initial protocol by Yao (1986). The currently fastest
protocol by Damgard et al. uses one public value and we have shown that the
fastest with two private values by Fischlin
is significantly slower than our homomorphic comparison (Kerschbaum and
Terzidis 2006).
The only other practically deployed secure computation has been described by
Bogetoft et al. (2006; improved in 2009).
It implements a secure auction protocol.
They implement the same decoupling between user interaction and computation
as we do and limit computation to a constant sized set of servers, i.e. they compute using several, but mutually distrustful service providers. While this model is
not readily applicable to the cloud, it may
give rise to a new type of service provider
that obviously participates in a secure
computation. Their reported computation times are on the same order as ours.
There exist a number of other frameworks for secure computation which
are based on general protocols. The
first for secure two-party computation
was FairPlay (Malkhi et al. 2004). Later
VIFF (2010), ShareMind (2010) and FairPlayMP (Ben-David et al. 2008) follow for secure multi-party computation.
Since all of them are based on general
secure computation protocols which can
implement any functionality, but are not
optimized for the functionality, it remains to be seen whether they will ever
be practically used due to the high computational requirements.
To the best of our knowledge no computations on encrypted data in the cloud
using any form of homomorphic encryption (Gentry 2009) have been reported so
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Abstract
Florian Kerschbaum

Secure and Sustainable
Benchmarking in Clouds
A Multi-Party Cloud Application
with an Untrusted Service Provider
Cloud computing entails a novel security threat: The cloud service provider
is entrusted with the data of all its customers. This may not be sustainable for
highly conﬁdential data. Encryption, or
more generally cryptography, may provide a solution by computing on data
encrypted by the customers. While this
solution is theoretically appealing, it
raises a number of research questions
in information system design.
Using the example of collaborative
benchmarking the author presents and
evaluates an exemplary design and implementation of a cloud application
that operates only on encrypted data,
thus protecting the conﬁdentiality of
the customer’s data against the cloud
service provider. The cloud application computes common statistics for
benchmarking without disclosing the
individual key performance indicators.
Benchmarking is an important process for companies to stay competitive
in today’s markets. It allows them to
evaluate their performance against the
statistics of their peers and implement
targeted improvement measures.
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far. Our experiences building the benchmarking platform are therefore the first
and we hope they provide sufficient insight in order to inspire future research
in the topic.

10 Summary and Outlook
In this paper we examined confidentiality-preserving cloud computing, i.e.
the computation on encrypted data in the
cloud. We presented the available design
choices using an example cloud application for collaborative benchmarking. It
addresses the security threat of a confidentiality breach by the service provider
by computing on encrypted data thereby
reducing the necessary trust assumptions. We compare the different models
of homomorphic encryption and secure
computation and implemented a hybrid
model for improved performance. Our
experience from building this cloud application revealed a number of insights
some contrary to common belief.
First, encrypting data is not enough. The
information revealed by the result may
imply the input by inverse computation.
It is therefore necessary to carefully design and evaluate the functionality implemented on encrypted data. In our case
it was necessary to restrict each party to
participate in at most one peer group per
KPI. We can show that if the size of the
peer group is large enough, the KPIs remain private.
We note that there are no formal tools
or methods yet for this type of analysis
and all work needs to be performed manually by skilled researchers and engineers.
This is a clear opportunity for future research in providing formal methods and
tools for verifying the security of the application.
Second, security should match the business objectives. It is difficult, if not impossible, to prevent all attacks by malicious
adversaries on encrypted cloud computing, since the input is encrypted opening wide the door to denial-of-service attacks. It is therefore necessary to align the
objectives of the cloud application with
the economic objectives of the participants.
In our benchmarking application we
use incentive-compatible statistics and
enhance the security against economically motivated adversaries. This implies
that some simple protocols secure against
only passive adversaries are no longer applicable, such as key exchange using the

cloud service provider, and we need a
trusted third party (certificate authority)
for the key exchange. Nevertheless, to the
best of our knowledge, our benchmarking protocol is the first instance of a protocol that is more efficient against a rational attacker than a malicious one. We
believe that there will be many more such
cases and look forward to this research
and development.
Third, inequality comparison of homomorphically encrypted integer plaintexts is
possible. Our result predates the development of fully homomorphic encryption
and has applications outside of comparison. Our comparison method does not
fit existing formal security models, but
we devised a new one and hope to see
many more research results in this area.
In particular it seems challenging to extend the method to other computations
beside comparison and general results are
required.
Fourth, computational performance will
remain the bottleneck. While we can show
that performance for benchmarking is
acceptable, more complicated computations are likely not. The benchmarking
functionality can be computed locally in
15 ms. In comparison to our benchmarking protocol this is a factor of roughly
60.000. This comparison is not entirely
fair, since a secure cloud application always implies some overhead for secure
transmission and storage of data, but we
could show that network performance
can be effectively reduced by parallelization. The main obstacle therefore remains computational performance.
In this respect our homomorphic comparison also significantly improves over
other homomorphic encryption, such
as Gentry’s general construction (Gentry 2009) or Fischlin’s bitwise comparison (Fischlin 2001), because our performance matches that of partially (additive) homomorphic encryption.
We anticipate that the improvement of
performance will remain the major research challenge for computation on encrypted data. In fact it is a question of
simple economics whether the application justifies the expenditure for the computational capacity and response wait
time. In case cryptography does not provide sufficiently efficient solutions sufficiently fast, industry is likely to look
for alternatives. In the current boom of
cloud computing this may be a missed
opportunity, since there seems to be no
technical alternatives for preventive measures against confidentiality breaches by
the service provider.
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Fifth, separating user interaction and
computation may provide an alternative.
In applications, such as our collaborative
benchmarking, that allow this separation
it may provide an alternative way of designing the system that a user can accept.
Furthermore, since the service provider
can then schedule the computation this
enables better load balancing. Already the
first application appeared (Bogetoft et al.
2009) and we anticipate many more following this design choice.
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